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Abstract
We present SOLAR, a new analysis tool for automatically de-
tecting standard violation errors in Ethereum smart contracts.
Given the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode of
a smart contract and a user specified constraint or invariant
derived from a technical standard such as ERC-20, SOLAR
symbolically executes the contract, explores all possible ex-
ecution paths, and checks whether it is possible to initiate a
sequence of malicious transactions to violate the specified
constraint or invariant. Our experimental results highlight the
effectiveness of SOLAR in finding new errors in smart con-
tracts. Out of the evaluated 779 ERC-20 and 310 ERC-721
smart contracts, SOLAR found 255 standard violation errors
in 197 vulnerable contracts with only three false positives.
237 out of the 255 errors are zero-day errors that are not re-
ported before. Our results sound the alarm on the prevalence
of standard violation errors in critical smart contracts that
manipulate publicly traded digital assets.
1 Introduction
Following the success of the cryptocurrencies [25, 32],
blockchain has recently evolved into a technology platform
that powers secure, decentralized, and consistent transaction
ledgers at Internet-scale. Smart contract deployment is one of
the most important features of many new blockchain systems
such as Ethereum [32]. Users can develop smart contracts
at a high level programming language to encode arbitrarily
complicated transaction rules. These developed contracts are
compiled to a low level Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
bytecode and are eventually deployed to Ethereum. The con-
tracts and the transaction rules are then faithfully executed
and enforced by all participants of the Ethereum network,
eliminating any potential counter-party risk of the encoded
transactions in future.
Because smart contracts are in fact programs that directly
manipulate critical information such as digital assets, finan-
cial records, and even identities, ensuring the correctness of
these contracts is essential. Unfortunately, human program-
mers often make mistakes and errors and the consequence
of programming errors in smart contracts is particularly se-
vere. For example, an anonymous attacker exploited an integer
overflow vulnerability of the BeautyChain smart contract in
Ethereum to illegally generate a massive amount of BECTo-
kens, the underlying digital assets of the contract. This attack
caused the market cap of BECTokens, which was two billion
dollars at the time of the attack, to evaporate in days [9]. An-
other famous example is the DAO attack which caused 50
million dollars in losses and a community dividing hard fork
of Ethereum to recover the stolen fund [14].
On one hand, to alleviate the correctness problem of smart
contracts, the blockchain community has created many tech-
nical standards for common kinds of smart contracts such as
digital assets, identity tokens, and domain name services [1–4].
A technical standard typically defines a set of interface func-
tions that a contract following the standard should implement,
together with specifications for each of the interface func-
tions. This community driven effort is partially successful.
For example, most smart contracts that manage digital assets
are now developed under relevant technical standards such
as ERC-20 [3] and ERC-721 [4]. However, it is unclear how
many of such deployed contracts actually conform to the stan-
dards, because a programming error may still cause a contract
implementation to deviate from its intended behavior.
On the other hand, previous research has been focusing
on developing analysis tools for Ethereum smart contracts
to detect potentially dangerous low-level runtime errors such
as integer overflows and contract reentrance [24, 28]. How-
ever, these tools often report an excessive amount of false
warnings because 1) many reported low-level warnings are
actually benign errors and 2) these analysis tools do not accu-
rately handle storage access instructions in Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM). Also these tools have a limited scope and
cannot detect logic errors where the implementation simply
deviates from the intended specifications without any runtime
error. Furthermore most of these tools require the access of
the smart contract source code and cannot apply to the EVM
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bytecode directly. These drawbacks limit the applications of
any prior art.
1.1 SOLAR
We present SOLAR, a novel symbolic execution analysis tool
for detecting standard violation errors in Ethereum smart con-
tracts. Given a set of constraints and invariants derived from
the standard to which a contract conforms, SOLAR validates
whether it is possible for the contract to violate the given
constraints and invariants. If so, SOLAR generates an error
report that include the initial contract state and the sequence
of transactions to trigger the violation.
Instead of focusing on low-level runtime errors, SO-
LAR takes advantages of the standardization effort by the
blockchain community. SOLAR exploits the fact that smart
contracts following a common technical standard such as
ERC-20 are essentially sharing the same set of specifications
defined by the standard. SOLAR therefore provides an expres-
sive language to allow users to develop invariants and safety
constraints derived from a technical standard. Once devel-
oped, these invariants and constraints can then be applied to
check all smart contracts that conform to the same standard.
Unlike previous tools, SOLAR does not suffer from the prob-
lem of benign errors, because all errors that SOLAR detects
correspond to deviations between a contract implementation
and the corresponding standard.
SOLAR models the behavior of a smart contract as a state
machine where external transactions invoke associated con-
tract functions to drive the state transition. Given a constraint
of a sequence of transactions, SOLAR symbolically executes
the associated contract functions. During the symbolic exe-
cution, SOLAR queries an SMT solver to determine whether
there is a possible assignment scheme of the initial contract
state and the transaction input parameters to cause the contract
execution violating the specified constraint.
To build a symbolic execution engine for EVM bytecode,
it is important to accurately and efficiently handle storage
load and store instructions. There are two kinds of storages
in EVM, a persistent contract state that contains non-volatile
data across different transactions and a volatile memory that
contains temporary data during the process of one transaction.
One challenge SOLAR faces is that load and store instruc-
tions of the contract persistent state in EVM are often paired
with special cryptographic hash instructions to compute the
address locations of the loaded/stored object. Naively pro-
cessing these cryptographic computations would generate
complicated symbolic expressions that SMT solvers cannot
solve. Another challenge SOLAR faces is that the bit width
of the stored volatile memory values is different from other
parts of EVM. The volatile memory operates with 8-bit val-
ues, while the stack and the persistent state all operate with
256-bit values. Naively processing load and store instructions
of the volatile memory would generate a large number of bit
extraction and concatenation operations in symbolic expres-
sions and would significantly slow down the performance of
the symbolic execution engine.
To address the challenge of cryptographic computations
associated with persistent state loads and stores, SOLAR op-
erates with a customized addressing mechanism for the per-
sistent state when running the symbolic execution. This cus-
tomized mechanism enables SOLAR to replace cryptographic
computations with lightweight computations. In the same
time, it still guarantees the free of address collisions so that
the program remains functionally equivalent. To address the
challenge introduced by the volatile memory bit width, SO-
LAR uses a symbolic cache to track all 256-bit values stored
into the volatile memory. For the common case where the
256-bit value is later loaded from the volatile memory as a
whole, the cache will detect this and return the cached value to
skip processing bit extraction and concatenation instructions.
These two techniques together enable efficient and accurate
symbolic execution for EVM bytecode.
1.2 Experimental Results
We evaluated SOLAR with a benchmark set of the top 779
ERC-20 and the top 310 ERC-721 smart contracts from Ether-
scan [5], the most popular Ethereum blockchain explorer.
ERC-20 and ERC-721 are two important smart contract stan-
dards which define the specifications for implementing fun-
gible and non-fungible digital assets. Many of the evaluated
contracts manage digital assets that are publicly traded on
crypto-exchanges. We applied SOLAR to check whether these
contracts satisfy the total supply invariant and the transfer
functionalities defined by the ERC-20 and ERC-721 stan-
dards.
Our experimental results highlight the effectiveness of SO-
LAR in finding security errors in Ethereum smart contracts.
SOLAR found in total 255 standard violation errors in these
1089 contracts. Note that 237 out of the found 255 errors are
zero-day errors, i.e., to the best of our knowledge, we believe
that these errors are not reported before. We compared the re-
sults of SOLAR with Mythril [24], the state-of-the-art contract
analysis tool developed by the Ethereum community. For the
same set of smart contracts, Mythril reported 1115 high sever-
ity errors from 512 ERC-20 contracts and 595 errors from 217
ERC-721 contracts. However, our manual analysis show that
most of these reported errors are false positives and/or benign
errors. We sampled 100 smart contracts to manually compare
the results of SOLAR and Mythril. Among the 100 sampled
contracts, SOLAR reported 36 errors from 24 contracts with
no false positive, while Mythril reported 127 errors from 60
contracts with only one true positive (which is also found by
SOLAR as well)1.
164 of the Mythril reported errors in the sampled 100 contracts are false
positives caused by the inaccuracy of the Mythril symbolic execution engine
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Our experimental results sound the alarm on the preva-
lence of standard violation errors, i.e., even the top smart
contracts that manipulate critical digital assets often do not
fully conform to their corresponding standards. Out of the
255 found errors, 7 errors correspond to severe vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by any user in the blockchain and the un-
derlying digital assets are immediately threatened; 47 errors
correspond to owner backdoors which are only exploitable
by the contract owners; 20 errors correspond to subtle con-
straint violations that are not immediately exploitable given
the current blockchain state but they may become exploitable
as the blockchain state changes; the remaining 181 errors are
non-exploitable standard deviations in customized features
but they may cause undesirable experience if other users or
contracts interact with them.
1.3 Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• SOLAR: This paper presents a novel security analysis
tool, SOLAR, which enables users to specify customized
constraints and invariants to detect EVM smart contract
errors that cause deviations between a contract imple-
mentation and the corresponding specification.
• Symbolic Execution for EVM Bytecode: This paper
presents a symbolic execution framework for EVM byte
code. In particular, it presents novel techniques for effi-
ciently handling EVM instructions that access the per-
sistent state and the volatile memory.
• Evaluation of SOLAR: This paper presents a systemat-
ical evaluation of SOLAR on a benchmark set of 1089
smart contracts. SOLAR found 255 errors in total and
237 out of the 255 errors are zero-day errors.
• Standard Violation Alarm: This paper is the first to
identify the prevalence of standard violation errors in
critical smart contracts that manipulate publicly traded
digital assets. The total market cap of these vulnerable
zero-day smart contracts is more than nine hundred mil-
lion dollars at the time of writing this paper2. This paper
also presents analyses and case studies on these stan-
dard violation errors we found to guide future efforts to
eliminate such errors in smart contracts.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a motivating example to illustrate SOLAR.
Section 3 presents the technical design of SOLAR. Section 4
discusses the implementation of SOLAR. We evaluate SOLAR
with experiments and analyze standard violation errors we
found with SOLAR in Section 5. We finally discuss related
work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
when handling storage accesses; the remaining 62 reported errors are benign,
e.g., integer overflows that are later filtered by assertions and conditions.
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1 contract BecToken {
2 uint256 public totalSupply;
3 mapping(address => uint256) public balanceOf;
4
5 function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value)
public returns (bool) {↪→
6 require(_to != address(0));
7 require(_value > 0 && _value <=
balanceOf[msg.sender]);↪→
8 require(_value + balanceOf[_to] > balanceOf[_to]);
9 balanceOf[msg.sender] = balanceOf[msg.sender] -
_value;↪→
10 balanceOf[_to] = balanceOf[_to] + _value;
11 Transfer(msg.sender, _to, _value);
12 return true;
13 }
14
15 function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers,
uint256 _value) public whenNotPaused returns
(bool) {
↪→
↪→
16 uint cnt = _receivers.length;
17 /* Integer overflow */
18 uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;
19 require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
20 require(_value > 0 && balanceOf[msg.sender] >=
amount);↪→
21 balanceOf[msg.sender] =
balanceOf[msg.sender].sub(amount);↪→
22 for (uint i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
23 balanceOf[_receivers[i]] =
balanceOf[_receivers[i]].add(_value);↪→
24 Transfer(msg.sender, _receivers[i], _value);
25 }
26 return true;
27 }
28 }
Figure 1: Simplified source code from BECToken.
2 Example
In this section, we present a motivating example of how
SOLAR detects an invariant violation error in the smart con-
tract of BECToken. Figure 1 presents the simplified source
code of this example. BECToken is an ERC-20 contract [3]
deployed on Ethereum blockchain. ERC-20 is a technical
standard that defines a set of contract interface functions to
implement a digital token asset. Specifically in an ERC-20
contract, the public property or the function balanceOf()
should return the amount of tokens that the given address
owns (line 3 in Figure 1); the function transfer() should
transfer the specified amount of tokens from the address of the
message sender to the specified receiver address (lines 5-13);
the public property or the function totalSupply() should
return the total amount of the circulated tokens (line 2). An
ERC-20 contract should also satisfy the following invariant:
the sum of token balances of all addresses should equal to the
total supply at any time.
In Figure 1, the public balanceOf map stores the balance
of each address; the public totalSupply variable stores the
3
1 sum = 0
2 for address in ADDRS:
3 bal = C.balanceOf(address)
4 check(sum + bal >= sum)
5 sum += bal
6 check(sum == C.totalSupply())
Figure 2: User specified invariant.
current total supply of the token. BECToken implements
transfer() accordingly with these two global variables.
Note that these global variables will reside on the Ethereum
blockchain permanently so that any full node in Ethereum can
access and verify the current BECToken state including the
balance of any address. Also note that uint256 is a special
large integer type in Ethereum with 256 bits.
However, BECToken implements a customized batch trans-
fer function called batchTransfer(). The intended behavior
of batchTransfer() is to transfer the specified amount of
tokens from the address of the transaction initiator to each
address in a specified array. Unfortunately, there is an integer
overflow error at line 18, where the statement calculates the
total transferred amount. Specifically, if an attacker creates a
transaction and calls batchTransfer() with _value as 2255
and _receivers containing two addresses, amount would be-
come zero after the overflow (recall that amount has 256 bits).
This overflowed value in turn would enable the attacker to
bypass the security check at line 20. The consequence of this
attack is that the attacker could therefore send a large amount
of tokens that he or she does not own, effectively generating
BECTokens from the air and violating the ERC-20 standard.
Note that this vulnerability was exploited by an anonymous
attacker in 2018 April, who sent massive amount of generated
coins to crypto-exchanges for profit at the expense of other
honest token holders. The market cap of BECToken, which
was two billion USD at the time of the attack, evaporated in
days [9].
Specify Invariant: We next apply SOLAR to BECToken and
describe how SOLAR could detect this vulnerability. We first
provide SOLAR the total supply invariant we want to check
as Figure 2. In SOLAR, users write invariants in a syntax
similar to Python. In Figure 2, the C keyword is a predefined
variable as the handle of the being checked contract; ADDRS is
another predefined variable to represent the set of all possible
addresses. The invariant in Figure 2 iterates over all addresses,
calls balanceOf() to retrieve the balance of each address,
and then checks whether the sum of these balances equals to
the result returned by totalSupply(). There is also a special
check at line 4 to make sure that the computation of the sum
does not cause integer overflow errors.
Note that the user does not need the access of the con-
tract source code in Figure 1 to write this invariant. The user
only needs to know the contract Application Binary Interface
(ABI), which is specified by smart contract standards and is
typically published by the developers as well. In fact, Figure 1
1 # Invariant as the pre-condition
2 sum = 0
3 for address in ADDRS:
4 bal = C.balanceOf(address)
5 assume(sum + bal >= sum)
6 sum += bal
7 assume(sum == C.totalSupply())
8 # Invoke the checked function
9 raddrs = SymArray()
10 amount = SymInt()
11 C.batchTransfer(raddrs, amount, sender=SymAddr())
12 # Check invariant as the post-condition
13 sum = 0
14 for address in ADDRS:
15 bal = C.balanceOf(address)
16 check(sum + bal >= sum)
17 sum += bal
18 check(sum == C.totalSupply())
Figure 3: Constraints generated by SOLAR.
is a general-purpose invariant that not just the BECToken
contract but all ERC-20 contracts should satisfy.
Generate Function Constraints: Because the invariant in
Figure 2 should be satisfied before and after every func-
tion invocation, SOLAR automatically generates a function
constraint from the invariant for each interface function of
BECToken. Figure 3 presents the generated constraint for
batchTransfer(). At lines 1-7, the generated constraint en-
sures that the invariant holds for the initial state of the con-
tract before the invocation of batchTransfer(). At lines
8-11, the constraint invokes batchTransfer() with a sym-
bolic array of receiving addresses and a symbolic integer
amount. caller = SymAddr() at line 11 also makes the
transaction initiated by a symbolic address as well. Note
that symbolic values here mean that these values are external
inputs and reflect the fact that anyone can initiate a transac-
tion to call batchTransfer() with arbitrary parameters. At
lines 12-18, the generated constraint checks the total supply
invariant again to check that the invariant is satisfied after
the batchTransfer() call. Note that users can also write
constraints like those in Figure 3 directly. Such capability
is useful when the user wants to use SOLAR to check dedi-
cated properties of one function rather than general invariants.
In our experiments, we utilized this capability of SOLAR to
check function specific properties of our benchmark contracts.
See Section 5 for more details.
Symbolic Execution: SOLAR then runs symbolic execution
analysis on the contract EVM bytecode to check each of
the generated constraint. The symbolic execution engine
of SOLAR initializes program values in the global states
as fresh symbolic variables similar to input parameters of
batchTransfer(). The global states include variables like
totalSupply and balances in lines 2 and 3 in Figure 1 and
blockchain states like the block height and timestamp that
might be queried by the contract program. SOLAR then sym-
4
c ∈ Integer
I, I1, . . . , In ∈ Inst ::=push c|pop|swap|dup|
stop|jumpi c|add|eq| · · · |
addrof|addrofmap|sstore|
sload|assume|check
x,y,z ∈ SymVar s ∈ SymArray
ψ,E,E1,E2 ∈ SymExpr ::=c |x |E1opE2 |Load(S,E1)
S ∈ SymAExpr ::=s|Store(S,E1,E2)
K,A ∈ SymStack ::=E ◦K|ε
Figure 4: Core Language
bolically executes the generated constraint and the contract
EVM bytecode to maintain a map that maps each program
value to a symbolic expression. The symbolic expression
represents the computation of deriving the corresponding pro-
gram value from initial global states and input parameters.
SOLAR also maintains a symbolic path constraint, which is the
constraint that initial global states and input parameters need
to satisfy in order to exercise the current execution path. The
symbolic execution engine updates the path constraint when
it processes conditional branches and require statements.
Detect Error: When the symbolic execution engine pro-
cesses the check statements (e.g., lines 16 and 18 in Figure 3),
SOLAR uses an off-the-shelf SMT solver [26] to determine
whether it is possible find an assignment scheme of initial
global states and input parameters such that the check condi-
tion is false. If so, SOLAR successfully detects an error and
the solver will return the error triggering assignment scheme
as the error report.
In our example, when SOLAR processes the check state-
ment at line 18 in Figure 3, the solver returns that it is possible
to violate this condition by setting _value to a large number.
Appendix A presents a concrete example that SOLAR gener-
ates to violate the total supply invariant. With the above assign-
ment, the security check balances(msg.sender)>=amount
in line 20 in Figure 1 is bypassed and msg.sender is able to
send more tokens to receivers than it owns. After the execu-
tion of batchTransfer(), the check condition at line 18 in
Figure 3 is violated. SOLAR therefore successfully detects
and reports this error to the user.
3 Design
We next formally present the design of the SOLAR symbolic
execution engine.
3.1 Core Language
A smart contract transaction is a tuple T = 〈P,A〉, where P
is the combined bytecode program of the invoked contract
function and A is an input stack that contains all transaction
input parameters including the sender account address.
Figure 4 presents the syntax of a simplified stack based
virtual machine language that we will use to illustrate the
symbolic execution engine of SOLAR in this section. Similar
to the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) and other standard
virtual machine languages, a program in this language is a
map that maps integers (i.e., program counters) to instructions.
The program executes with an execution stack. Given an
initial execution stack that contains input transaction values
and an initial state of the persistent blockchain storage, the
program execution starts with the program counter being zero
and ends when the execution reaches the stop instruction.
All program values during the execution are integers and
similar to EVM all integers have a fixed width of 256 bits. All
computations during the execution also happen with 256 bits,
e.g., an equal comparison instruction will produce a 256 bit
integer zero if the two operands are not equal and a 256 bit
integer one if the operands are equal.
The language has four execution stack manipulation instruc-
tions, push for pushing an extra constant into the stack, pop
for popping the top value from the stack, swap for swapping
the last two elements, and dup for duplicating the top value
of the stack. The language also has various arithmetic and
comparison instructions such as add and eq, each of which
pops values from the execution stack as operands and push the
computation result back. jumpi is the jump instruction which
checks the top value at the stack and conditionally jumps to a
specified program counter.
Instructions addrof and addrofmap are used to compute
the address of a variable, an array, or a map. Each of these in-
structions is followed with either sload or sstore, which are
instructions for accessing the persistent state of the contract.
The persistent state of the contract is a flat map that maps
256 bit integer addresses to 256 bit integer values. addrof or
addrofmap fetches a global variable slot index and an array
index or a map key form the stack, computes a cryptographic
hash, and pushes the hash result to the stack as the address.
The following sload or sstore then accesses the memory
at the computed address. Note that for brevity, the language
in Figure 4 omits many features of EVM such as the volatile
memory, the ether account balance, the gas system, and mis-
cellaneous blockchain states. Our SOLAR implementation
supports all these features. We will describe how SOLAR han-
dles the volatile memory in Section 3.4 and the remaining
EVM features in Section 4.
The assume and check instructions in Figure 4 represent
the corresponding functions in the user specified constraints.
We include them in the language so that we can illustrate
how SOLAR verifies the constraints. Note that our current
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implementation SOLAR performs symbolic executions on
both of the EVM bytecode of the checked contract and the
user specified constraints together. See Section 4.2.
3.2 Semantics for Symbolic Execution
Execution Environment: The environment of the symbolic
execution is a tuple σ = 〈pc,K,S,ψ〉. pc is the current pro-
gram counter value which could be an integer, nil (indicating
normal termination), or err (indicating errors). K is a stack
of symbolic expressions to represent the execution stack. The
symbolic execution differs from the normal execution in that
each concrete program value in the normal execution is in-
stead replaced by a symbolic expression. This symbolic ex-
pression tracks the sequences of computations of generating
the program value from initial state values and input values.
The symbolic array S represents the persistent state. A
symbolic array has two operations Store()and Load().
Store(S,E1,E2) updates a symbolic array by storing the sym-
bolic expression E2 at the symbolic index (expression) E1 and
returns the updated array. Load(S,E1) returns the symbolic
expression that corresponds to the last stored value at the
symbolic index (expression) E1. The symbolic expression ψ
denotes the current path constraint. The path constraint in
the symbolic execution denotes the constraint that the initial
state values and the input values must satisfy to make the
current execution path feasible. See Figure 4 for the syntax
of symbolic variables, expressions, and arrays.
Small Step Semantics: Figure 5 presents the rules of the
small step semantics for our symbolic execution. Each rule
is of the form σ=J I K⇒ σ′. It denotes that given the original
execution state σ, after executing the instruction I the new
execution state can be σ′. The rules for push, pop, swap, dup,
add, and eq are self-explanatory. They fetch operands from
the current execution stack and update the stack with the
results accordingly.
The rule for assume updates the path constraint with the
assumed constraint. There are two rules for jumpi, one for
the true branch and the other one for the false branch. Besides
changing the program counter, these rules also update the path
constraints to indicate additional constraints on the input and
initial state values for exercising the corresponding execution
paths. The rule for check is similar to jumpi and assume. But
if the checked constraint fails, the rule updates the program
counter to err.
The rules for addrof and addrofmap take two operands
from the stack and use a hash function Hash to compute
the address for the followed store instructions. The rule for
sstore updates the symbolic array with a Store operation
and the rule for sload pushes a fresh symbolic variable x to
the stack to represent the loaded value and puts an additional
constraint to ensure that x equals to the value that a Load
operation on S returns. Note that Hash denotes a special hash
function that converts two symbolic expressions (correspond-
ing to the global variable index and the array index or the map
key) into a single 256 bit address. This faithfully matches the
behavior of the EVM bytecode generated by the compiler of
Solidity [7], the most popular high-level language for devel-
oping Ethereum smart contracts. The compiler generates code
to use SHA3 [32] function to determine the final address of a
stored object.
3.3 Main Algorithm
Figure 6 presents our main symbolic execution algorithm.
The input to the algorithm is a list of transactions, because a
user specified constraint can check the behavior of multiple
transactions in sequence. Γ in Figure 6 maintains the set
of active execution states and we initialize Γ with the input
stack of the first transaction as the execution stack and a fresh
symbolic array as the persistent state at line 1. Each iteration
of the main loop at lines 3-14 selects one active state σ from
Γ and symbolically executes on σ for one step with the rules
in Figure 5. For each possible result state σ′, it first invokes
the underlying SMT solver to determine whether the path
constraint is satisfiable at line 7. If not, then it is discarded
as an impossible state. Then it checks whether the program
counter reaches err, which indicates a constraint violation.
If so, it will generate an error report. If not, it pushes the new
state back to Γ.
When selecting states in line 4 in Figure 6, SOLAR uses the
depth first strategy and always selects the newly-generated
state. Instead of bounding the number of loop iterations to
make the symbolic execution in Figure 6 computationally
tractable, SOLAR provides each transaction limited gas and
the transaction aborts if the gas is exhausted. The rationale
is that most errors can be triggered with a limited number of
iterations and a small size of array.
3.4 Storage Access Optimization
Address Scheme: Handling the cryptographic hash functions
in the address computation in EVM is challenging. If we
encode SHA3 computations directly into the symbolic expres-
sion, the resulted expressions will be too complicated for any
SMT solver to solve. One naive approach is to give up and
return a fresh symbolic variable to represent the loaded value
when facing complicated symbolic addresses. This approach
is adopted by previous work like Mythril [24]. It makes the
analysis results inaccurate and may introduce many false pos-
itives. Another naive approach is to concretize address values
to avoid handling cryptographic computations symbolically.
This approach is adopted by other previous work [28], but
such concretization may cause the symbolic expression size
to grow exponentially when analyzing contracts with multiple
storage accesses.
SOLAR instead replaces the address scheme in the addrof
and addrofmap with a customized function shown as Fig-
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〈pc,K,S,ψ〉=J push c K⇒ 〈pc+1,c◦K,S,ψ〉 〈pc,K,S,ψ〉=J stop K⇒ 〈nil,K,S,ψ,〉
〈pc,E1 ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J swap1 K⇒ 〈pc+1,E2 ◦E1 ◦ k,S,ψ〉 〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ,〉=J dup K⇒ 〈pc+1,E ◦E ◦K,S,ψ〉
〈pc,E ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J add K⇒ 〈pc+1,(E1 +E2)◦K,S,ψ〉 〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ,〉=J pop K⇒ 〈pc+1,K,S,ψ〉
〈pc,E ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J eq K⇒ 〈pc+1,(E1 = E2)◦K,S,ψ〉 〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J jumpi c K⇒ 〈pc+1,K,S,ψ∧ (E = 0)〉
〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J jumpi c K⇒ 〈c,K,S,ψ∧ (E 6= 0)〉 〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J assume K⇒ 〈pc+1,K,S,ψ∧ (E 6= 0)〉
〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J check K⇒ 〈pc+1,K,S,ψ∧ (E 6= 0)〉 〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J check K⇒ 〈err,K,S,ψ∧ (E = 0)〉
〈pc,E1 ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J addrof K⇒ 〈pc+1,Hash(E2,0)+E1 ◦K,S,ψ〉
〈pc,E1 ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J addrofmap K⇒ 〈pc+2,Hash(E2,E1)◦K,S,ψ〉
〈pc,E1 ◦E2 ◦K,S,ψ〉=J sstore K⇒ 〈pc+1,K,Store(S,E1,E2),ψ〉
〈pc,E ◦K,S,ψ〉=J sload K⇒ 〈pc+1,x◦K,S,ψ∧ (x = Load(S,E))〉
Figure 5: Small-Step Operational Semantics of Instructions for Symbolic Values
Input :A list of n transactions T1, T2, . . ., Tn, where
Ti = 〈Pi,Ai〉
1 σ0← 〈0,A1,s,true〉, where s is a free symbolic array
2 Γ←{〈σ0,1〉}
3 while Γ 6= /0 do
4 Select and remove a state 〈〈pc,K,S,ψ〉, i〉 from Γ
5 Σ′←{σ′|〈pc,K,S,ψ〉=J Pi(pc) K⇒ σ}
6 for σ′ = 〈pc′,K′,S′,ψ′〉 ∈ Σ′ do
7 if not Satisfiable(ψ′) then
8 continue
9 if pc′ = err then
10 GenerateReport(σ′)
11 else if pc′ 6= nil then
12 Γ← Γ∪{〈σ′, i〉}
13 else if i 6= n then
14 Γ← Γ∪{〈〈0,Ai+1,S′,ψ′〉, i+1〉}
Figure 6: Main loop
ure 7. The intuition is to avoid collisions of different global
objects without using expensive cryptographic hash functions.
SOLAR expand the address space of the persistent storage
with additional bits to fit both of the global slot index and the
key value. This guarantees no collision of different storage ob-
jects and it is functionally equivalent to the original contract
behavior (as long as attackers cannot find collisions in SHA3
to trigger object collisions in the original contract). More im-
portantly, the computation in Figure 7 is much cheaper for an
SMT solver to handle.
In the current implementation, SOLAR bounds the size
of any dynamically sized objects (i.e., arrays and maps) to
three. This enables SOLAR to focus on exploring new states
that more likely contain errors than less productive states in
iterative structures. Although the bound in theory may cause
the analysis to miss some errors, in practice we found no
1 function Hash(E1,E2) :
Input :The global slot index E1 and the index for the
store E2
Output :The hashed address E′
2 E ′← BitExtend(E1,256)
3 E ′← ShiftLeft(E ′,256)+E2
Figure 7: Customized address scheme function.
error requiring more than three elements in dynamically sized
objects to trigger in our experiments.
This bound also enables SOLAR to further reduce the num-
ber of bits used in the computation in Figure 7. The bound
limits the maximum index of the stores for arrays (E2 in Fig-
ure 7). For common map cases, the map keys are Ethereum
account addresses. SOLAR collects all possible account ad-
dresses into an address pool (see Section 4.3) and normalize
them into bounded integer indexes as well. With these two
optimizations, SOLAR actually does not need to shift 256 bits
to avoid collisions. In our current implementation, SOLAR
keeps the computed addresses as 256 bit vectors to simplify
the resulting symbolic expressions.
Note that SOLAR distinguishes maps from other dynamic
objects in EVM bytecode with the following heuristics. In
EVM, the maps are not stored sequentially and the map keys
participate the cryptographic computation for determining the
final addresses of mapped values. In contrast, other objects
like array are stored sequentially. SOLAR therefore statically
analyzes EVM instruction sequences before each load and
store to determine the data type of the accessed object.
Volatile Memory: Besides global persistent state S described
in this section, EVM also contains volatile memory to store
temporary data which will be wiped after each transaction
execution finishes. SOLAR models memory using a symbolic
array similar to the global persistent state. Note that unlike
the persistent state, the memory does not use complicated
cryptographic hash functions for computing addresses so that
the address scheme is continuous and simpler.
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However, one challenge of handling the memory is that
unlike the rest of EVM programs which use 256 bit inte-
ger values, the memory maps 256 bit address to 8 bit values.
Therefore storing a 256 bit value from stack to the memory
requires the system to break the value into 32 bytes and store
each of them separately. Naively processing these data trans-
fer instructions will cause the symbolic execution engine to
generate numerous redundant bit operations for symbolic ex-
pressions if the checked constraints contain intensive memory
operations. Appendix B presents such an example. Such re-
dundant operations will slow down the underlying SMT solver
dramatically. To address this challenge, SOLAR maintains a
cache to optimize volatile memory access during symbolic ex-
ecutions. SOLAR detects instruction patterns like Appendix B
which store and load 256 bit values into and from the mem-
ory. When the program stores a symbolic 256 bit value into
the memory, the cache records the address and the 256 bit
symbolic value. When the program loads a symbolic 256 bit
value from the memory, SOLAR queries the SMT solver to
determine whether the loaded address corresponds to only
one possible cached address from the cache. If so, SOLAR
returns the corresponding symbolic value from cache directly
without generating redundant bit extraction and concatenation
operations.
Results: Our experimental results show that our storage ac-
cess optimizations increase the efficiency of the system dra-
matically. In our experiments, the combination of the address
scheme optimization and the volatile memory optimization
enable SOLAR to find out 67 more errors and/or to generate
much less false positives than other alternative approaches.
See Section 5.
4 Implementation
We built SOLAR on top of Manticore [28], an open source
symbolic execution framework. The original Manticore does
not fully support EVM instructions, does not support user
defined constraints, and handles storage access addressing
inefficiently with concretization. Besides the algorithms de-
scribed in Section 3, SOLAR is extended to support all EVM
instructions described in Ethereum yellow paper [32]. SOLAR
uses boolector [26] as its underlying SMT solver to check
satisfiability of the generated symbolic constraints during
symbolic executions.
4.1 EVM Bytecode
Indirect Jump: One difference between EVM and the core
language in Section 3 is that the jump instructions in EVM
are indirect, i.e., an EVM jump instruction fetches the jump
target address from the execution stack. To handle such jump
instructions, SOLAR checks whether the destination from the
stack is symbolic. If so, SOLAR gets all possible values from
the SMT solver and forks the current execution state for each
jump destination. In practice, the current implementation of
the Solidity compiler guarantees that the jump destination is
always constant.
Miscellaneous Blockchain State: Global blockchain states
such as timestamp and block height are initialized as fresh
symbolic variables. This is consistent with the fact that a
transaction may occur at any time and any state in Ethereum.
SOLAR updates these state values accordingly when new
transactions are generated. Each transaction is assigned with
enough gas to execute and SOLAR leverages the gas limit
system so that the system will stop after certain iterations.
4.2 User Constraints
User defined policies consist of 1) contract function calls, 2)
assumptions, and 3) safety constraints. SOLAR allows users
to write Python scripts to interact with a contract. Calling
a contract function is similar to normal function calls, and
the return value is deserialized from transaction return data.
SOLAR then translates those function calls into transactions
and symbolically executes them in sequential order. A user
can use assume(expr) to define the preconditions and as-
sumptions of transaction arguments and initial states. The
user can also use check(expr) to define safety constraints
that transaction executions must satisfy. SOLAR handles as-
sumptions and constraints in the same way as assume and
check instructions described in Section 3.
4.3 Address Pool
In the Python script of a user defined constraint, the ADDRS
keyword represents an address pool that the script can inter-
act with (as shown in Figure 3). When SOLAR starts, it first
populates the address pool with a fixed number of random
addresses. SOLAR then statically analyzes the EVM bytecode
and detects additional addresses using the following heuristic.
Different from other integer types, addresses in EVM are 160
bits and the usage of each address is accompanied by a bit op-
eration to extract the last 160 bits from a 256 bit integer from
the stack. SOLAR collects all detected concrete addresses into
the address pool as well.
4.4 Inter-Contract Call
Smart contracts in Ethereum can call functions defined in
other contracts. There are two usage scenarios of such inter-
contract calls. The first one is to reuse code in library contracts.
The second one is to send transactions to other smart contracts.
To handle an inter-contract call, SOLAR first assumes the call
belongs to the first scenario. SOLAR fetches and executes the
bytecode from the Ethereum blockchain. To keep the search
space included a reasonable size, SOLAR takes advantage of
storage access optimization. If the callee address is a symbolic
value and from the global storage, SOLAR fetches the current
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stored value from the Ethereum blockchain instead of solving
all possible values. If this address concretization fails, then
SOLAR conservatively assumes that the call belongs to the
second scenario and SOLAR will use a fresh symbolic value
to represent the returned value.
Reentrance Errors: One limitation of relying on user spe-
icifed constraints is that the user constraints may not specify
side effect that an external contract call could trigger. The
constraints therefore may miss reentrance errors. To this end,
SOLAR implements the “no write after external call” rule sim-
ilar to previous work [30] and can detect reentrance errors
with this rule. Specifically, the symbolic execution engine in
SOLAR will generate a reentrance error warning if there is
an execution path that the contract first 1) calls a non-library
external function and then 2) modifies the persistent state.
5 Evaluation
We next evaluate SOLAR with a set of 1089 real world smart
contracts. The goal this evaluation is to answer the following
questions:
1. How effective is SOLAR in finding standard violation
errors in Ethereum smart contracts?
2. What kinds of errors SOLAR find and how many of them
are zero-day errors?
3. How does SOLAR compare with previous smart contract
analysis tools?
4. How much improvement do the storage access optimiza-
tions in Section 3.4 have on the performance of SOLAR?
5.1 Methodology
ERC-20 and ERC-721: ERC-20 [3] and ERC-721 [4] are
two important smart contract standards, which define the con-
tract interface and specification for implementing fungible and
non-fungible digital assets respectively. Those two standards
are well-established and followed by many smart contracts
in Ethereum. Many of the underlying digital assets of these
contracts are publicly traded in crypto-exchanges. Given the
importance and the popularity of ERC-20 and ERC-721, we
therefore focus our evaluation on contracts following these
two standards.
Collect Benchmark Contracts: To collect a representative
data set, we downloaded all ERC-20 and ERC-721 token
contracts listed by Etherscan [5] on November 29, 2018 and
obtained in total 1089 contracts. We limit our study on these
top contracts in Etherscan because 1) we want to focus our
analysis on important constracts that manipulate critical digi-
tal assets and 2) many of the remaining ERC-20 and ERC-721
constracts in the blockchain are experimental or duplicate. Be-
sides the contract bytecode, we downloaded the application
binary interface (ABI) of each contract as well as the contract
source code. The ABI lists all public functions defined by
a contract, which enables SOLAR to call contract functions
and build symbolic transaction inputs. We downloaded the
source code from Etherscan in order to analyze and classify
the vulnerabilities. Note that this is for our manual analy-
sis and SOLAR does not require the source code to check a
contract.
Specify Constraints: We developed one invariant and two
constraints based on the semantic of ERC-20 interfaces [3]:
• Total Supply: The total supply invariant requires that
no matter which function is executed, the sum of account
balances equals the total supply of the token.
• Transfer: The transfer() function succeeds if and
only if sufficient tokens are supplied and the balances of
the receiver and sender should be updated accordingly.
• Approval: The transferFrom() function succeeds if
and only if the token owner authorizes the message
sender to do so and has a sufficient balance. Both ac-
count balances and allowance of the sender should be
updated if the function transferFrom() returns true.
Similarly, we developed one constraint based on the seman-
tic of ERC-721 interfaces [4]. The transferFrom() function
succeeds if and only if the token owner authorizes the mes-
sage sender to do so. A detailed explanation on how a user
checks the invariants and the constraints using SOLAR will
be provided in Appendix C.
Apply SOLAR: We apply SOLAR to downloaded contracts
to check the developed constraints. In our experiments, we
turned off the reentrance error detector in SOLAR to focus
on constraint violation errors. All experiments are performed
on a slurm cluster with two eight-core Intel Xeon E5-2680
processors and 96GB rams on each node. Specifically, SOLAR
allocates 20 minutes and 3GB memory for each contract. For
each error, SOLAR reports the function name, the violated
constraint, and a concrete transaction trace that triggers the
violation.
Note that in order to evaluate the effectiveness our op-
timizations in SOLAR for handling storage load and store
instructions (see Section 3.4), we implemented a baseline
version of SOLAR that does not enable the optimizations. For
the persistent state, the baseline implementation attempts to
concretize the address values whenever it encounters a load
and store instruction paired with cryptographic functions. For
the volatile memory, the baseline implementation naively pro-
cess every load and store instruction without the cache. We
apply this baseline version of SOLAR to all of our benchmark
contracts and compare the results with the normal version of
SOLAR.
Apply Mythril: We compare our results with Mythril [24],
the state-of-the-art open source security tool developed by
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Ethereum community. Mythril is able to detect integer over-
flow and reentrance errors. We download Mythril 0.20.0
which is the latest version as available on January 30, 2019.
We run Mythril with the default configuration to analyze all
collected smart contracts.
Analyze Detected Errors: We manually analyze each re-
ported error 1) to determine whether it is a true positive, be-
nign error, or false positive 2) to classify the error based on
who can trigger the error and the severity of the error and 3)
to check whether the error is reported before and contact the
contract owner and relevant stake holders about the issues
we found. Note that we classify a report as a benign error if
the error is not exploitable and is intended in the context. For
example, an integer overflow that is later filtered by a check
or an assertion before introducing any side effect is counted
as a benign error.
SOLAR reports 255 standard violation errors and 197 vul-
nerable contracts. We classify the 255 errors into four cate-
gories:
• Severe: Severe errors can be exploited by anyone and
may lead to financial loss of contract participants.
• Backdoor: Backdoor errors provide the contract owner
exploitable privileges that are not consistent with the
standard.
• Attackable: Attackable errors are theoretically ex-
ploitable, but the attack has to be performed at specific
time period or an attacker may need to acquire a large
amount of digital assets.
• Deviation: Some contracts implement their own fea-
tures that are not consistent with the standards. Although
we believe these errors are not exploitable, they may
cause financial loss to a user who interacts with these
contracts, if the user assumes the contracts conform to
the standards.
Mythril reports plenty of issues. Even for high severity is-
sues, Mythril reports 1115 errors from 513 ERC-20 contracts
and 595 errors from 217 ERC-721 contracts, which makes it
impossible to analyze them all manually. We therefore sam-
ple 100 ERC-20 contracts and analyze the errors reported by
Mythril on the sampled contracts. A detailed comparison can
be found in Section 5.3.
5.2 Results
We evaluate SOLAR for all 1089 smart contracts for policies
described in Appendix C. Figure 8 summarizes our exper-
imental results. Each row presents the results of the corre-
sponding invariant or constraint. Note that the fifth row sum-
marizes all errors from ERC-20 contracts. For columns 2-5,
each column represents the results for one type of errors, se-
vere errors, owner backdoors, attackable errors, and standard
deviations. Each cell presents two numbers. The first one is
the number of found errors and the second one is the number
of zero-day errors that are not reported before. The sixth col-
umn shows the number of contracts that do not implement all
required functions to perform the analysis. These contracts are
not conforming to the standards to implement all necessary
functions. And the seventh column represents the number of
false positives reported by SOLAR. Note that SOLAR does not
report any benign error in our experiments. The last column
presents the average execution time of SOLAR to report an
error.
Severe: SOLAR found 7 errors that are classified as "Severe".
There are three types of severe errors:
1. Contracts implement the approve() function without
providing the functionality that allows a user to revoke
the approval, which may lead to token loss if a user sets
the wrong approval.
2. Contracts allows a user to transfer others token without
approval.
3. The totalSupply variable is defined multiple times in
different parent contracts and transaction functions refer
to inconsistent totalSupply instances.
Backdoor: 47 out of 255 errors are classified as owner back-
doors. All of those errors provide the admin privileges to
modify balances of other accounts that are not allowed in the
ERC-20 standard.
Attackable: SOLAR detects 20 theoretically attackable errors
that the possibilities to exploit such contracts are rare. How-
ever, reusing the source code of such contracts may increase
the risk of being attacked.
Deviation: Some contracts implement their customized fea-
tures and deviate from the ERC-20 standard. Such devia-
tions might be intended and are not exploitable on their own,
but such contracts might be misused if the user assumes the
contract follows the standard. We classified 181 errors as
standard deviations. They can be further classified into two
types. Firstly, a contract may implement its own logic beside
ERC-20 interfaces such as locked token or transaction fees.
Secondly, many contracts do not implement ERC-20 inter-
faces as specified. For example, some contracts implement the
transfer() function without any return value. Based on the
EVM specification, the function returns 0 if no return value
is given which means the transfer() function returns false
even if the transaction succeeds. Such a contract is vulnerable
if it interacts with other contracts, and they use the return
value to check if a transaction succeeds.
Baseline Algorithm: The baseline algorithm analyzes 6335
functions without any exceptions and reports in total 188
errors, which is roughly twenty percent less than SOLAR.
We further examine that all errors reported by the baseline
algorithm are covered by SOLAR. The baseline algorithm
fails to report many errors that SOLAR does report because it
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Policy Severe Backdoor Attackable Deviation Missing False Positives Execution Time(s)
Total 2/1 47/33 20/20 87/87 19 3 187.47
Approve (ERC-20) 4/2 0/0 0/0 15/15 15 0 372.33
Transfer 0/0 0/0 0/0 95/95 5 2 119.02
ERC-20 Total 6/3 47/33 20/20 181/181 / 3 185.71
Approve (ERC-721) 1/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 116 0 944.94
Figure 8: Evaluation Summary
runs out of the time without the optimizations for handling
the persistent state and volatile memory.
Our results show that SOLAR is effective in finding stan-
dard violation errors. SOLAR flags 255 from 197 vulnerable
tokens and the tokens have a market capitalization of 2 billion
US dollars. 237 out of the 255 errors are new errors that are
not reported before. Our results also show that the symbolic
execution engine of SOLAR is fast due to our optimizations for
handling storage address schemes. We observe that 78% of
functions can be verified within 20 minutes by SOLAR. With-
out the optimization, only 68% of functions can be verified
within 20 minutes.
5.3 Comparison With Mythril
We run Mythril on all benchmark contracts. Due to the high
volume of reports generated by Mythril, we randomly sam-
pled 100 smart contracts to manually compare the results
of Mythril with SOLAR. Out of the 127 issues reported by
Mythril, there is only one true positive, which corresponds
to a severe vulnerability that is also reported by SOLAR. The
remaining 126 reported issues are either benign errors or false
positives.
Mythril generates 64 false positives for the 100 contracts,
because Mythril fails to handle load instructions to persistent
state with symbolic addresses. In such cases, Mythril always
returns a new unbounded symbolic value. If this unbounded
value is further used for arithmetic operations, Mythril will
very likely generate a false report. This again highlights the
importance of handling persistent state accurately for sym-
bolic execution of EVM bytecode. Mythril also generates
62 benign errors for the 100 contracts. The most common
cases correspond to integer overflows that are later filtered by
assertions or if statements before introducing any side effect.
For those errors not reported by Mythril, they contain logical
errors that cannot be detected based on low level EVM se-
mantics. Figure 9 presents one example of such logical errors,
which we will describe in details in Section 5.4.
Our results show that SOLAR is more accurate and effective
than Mythril. SOLAR is able to find significantly more errors
with much less false positives than Mythril in our experiments.
This is because SOLAR has a more accurate symbolic execu-
tion engine and SOLAR detects high level standard violations
1 function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint
value) returns (bool success) {↪→
2 if (frozenAccount[msg.sender]) return false;
3 if(balances[from] < value) return false;
4 if( allowed[from][msg.sender] >= value ) return
false;↪→
5 if(balances[to] + value < balances[to]) return
false;↪→
6 balances[from] -= value;
7 allowed[from][msg.sender] -= value;
8 balances[to] += value;
9 Transfer(from, to, value);
10 return true;
11 }
Figure 9: The RemiCoin contract code snippet.
1 function mint(address _holder, uint _value) external
{↪→
2 require(msg.sender == ico);
3 require(_value != 0);
4 require(totalSupply + _value <= TOKEN_LIMIT);
5 balances[_holder] += _value;
6 totalSupply += _value;
7 Transfer(0x0, _holder, _value);
8 }
Figure 10: The ATL contract code snippet.
instead of low level EVM errors, many of which could be
benign.
5.4 Case Studies
We next present one representative case for each type of stan-
dard violation errors that SOLAR found. We also present a
case where SOLAR generates a false positive due to the im-
precision of the supplied constraints.
Severe: Figure 9 shows the transferFrom() function from
RemiCoin 3 found by approval policy. There is a logic error
at line 4 that the conditional statement returns false if the al-
lowance is greater or equal than value. The correct behavior
is to return false if the allowance is smaller. This error allows
an attacker to transfer one account’s tokens to the other with-
out proper approval. Note that SOLAR successfully detected
this error, but Mythril cannot. This is because this logic error
is not associated with any other low-level runtime error.
3contract address: 0x7dc4f41294697a7903c4027f6ac528c5d14cd7eb
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1 function migrate(uint256 amount) {
2 Token(previousToken).transferFrom(msg.sender, this,
amount);↪→
3 pendingMigrations[msg.sender].dateTimeCreated = now;
4 pendingMigrations[msg.sender].amount = amount;
5 }
6 function claimMigrate() {
7 balances[msg.sender] +=
pendingMigrations[msg.sender].amount;↪→
8 totalSupply += pendingMigrations[msg.sender].amount;
9 delete pendingMigrations[msg.sender];
10 }
Figure 11: The simplified RexToken code snippet.
Backdoor: To allocate tokens on the fly, many tokens imple-
ment a mint function that allows the contract admin to issues
new tokens to others. However, missing security checks may
leave backdoors that allow the contract admin to modify bal-
ances of other accounts to an arbitrary number. Figure 10
shows the mint function from ATL 4. The mint() function
allows the contract owner to allocate tokens to an address
_holder. The function first verifies that the transaction is
from contract owner (line 2), and the value is not zero (line 3).
The contract sets a token limit that the total supply of this to-
ken should not be more than TOKEN_LIMIT (line 4). The func-
tion then updates the balance of _holder and totalSupply.
SOLAR found two issues from this function. Suppose the
owner calls mint() with a large _value. First, the guard
that token’s total supply should less than TOKEN_LIMIT can
be bypassed by an overflow attack. This allows the owner
to allocate more tokens than the contract allows. Second,
_holder’s balance can be overflowed and can be set to any
number at line 5. This effectively allows the owner to change
a user’s balance to an arbitrary number (e.g., to confiscate
tokens from a user).
Attackable: Figure 11 shows the migrate() and
claimMigrate() function from RexToken5. Those
two functions allow RexToken users to migrate their tokens
stored in previous contracts to this contract. While executing
the claimMigrate() function, it increases the balance
of the sender and the total supply of the token respectively
without any overflow check at lines 7 and 8. SOLAR marks
this contract as vulnerable because the total supply invariant
can be violated if the sender has large amount of token in
previous contract. Although this is theoretically exploitable,
we investigated these two contracts on Etherscan main chain
and such exploitations are not possible with the current
contract state.
Deviation: Figure 12 shows the simplified transfer() func-
tion from ParagonCoinToken6. Unlike other ERC-20 tokens,
ParagonCoinToken computes a transaction fee each time a
user transfer tokens to the other (line 6-7), which breaks the
4contract address: 0x78b7fada55a64dd895d8c8c35779dd8b67fa8a05
5contract address: 0xf05a9382A4C3F29E2784502754293D88b835109C
6contract address: 0x7728dFEF5aBd468669EB7f9b48A7f70a501eD29D
1 function transfer (address _to, uint256 _value)
returns (bool success) {↪→
2 uint256 fee = fee();
3 if (accounts [msg.sender] < _value) return false;
4 if (_value > fee && msg.sender != _to) {
5 accounts [msg.sender] = safeSub (accounts
[msg.sender], _value);↪→
6 accounts [_to] = safeAdd (accounts [_to],
safeSub(_value, fee));↪→
7 accounts [fund] = safeAdd (accounts [fund], fee);
8 tokensCount = safeSub (tokensCount, burnFee);
9 Transfer (msg.sender, fund, fee);
10 Transfer (msg.sender, _to, safeSub(_value, fee));
11 }
12 return true;
13 }
Figure 12: The ParagonCoinToken code snippet.
1 constructor() public {
2 ...
3 initialSupply = 4000000000;
4 totalSupply_ = initialSupply * 10 **
uint(decimals);↪→
5 balances[owner] = totalSupply_;
6 }
7 function balanceOf(address _holder) public view
returns (uint256 balance) {↪→
8 return balances[_holder] +
lockupInfo[_holder].lockupBalance;↪→
9 }
Figure 13: The PRASMToken code snippet.
transfer policy that all tokens should be transferred to re-
ceiver’s account. We believe this a deviation from ERC-20
standard. Note that a user can change the constraint to avoid
treating this constraint as vulnerable if desired.
False Positive: Figure 13 shows the balanceOf() function
from PRASMToken7. SOLAR reports that this contract may
break the specified constraints if an integer overflow occurs
when computing the balance at line 8 in Figure 13. This
is unfortunately a false positive because the total supply of
this contract is fixed as a constant after being initialized dur-
ing the contract construction at line 4. Therefore, the sum
of balances[_holder] and lockupBalance at line 8 will
never overflow. SOLAR generates this false positive because
the general purpose constraints we used do not capture the
precondition of the total supply. In fact, a more precise set
of constraints will enable SOLAR to eliminate all three false
positives in our experiments.
5.5 Summary
Our experimental results show that standard violation errors
are prevalent in Ethereum smart contracts. Over one sixth
of evaluated ERC-20 and ERC-721 contracts contain one
or more standard violation errors. We found that for many
7contract address: 0x1a66e09f7dccc10eae46e27cfa6b8d44a50df1e7
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contracts that are supposed to follow a standard, their im-
plementations in the end deviate from the intended standard
behavior. This surprising result calls for more efforts from the
community to validate the consistency between the contract
standards and the actual implementations. We also have the
following important findings in our experiments.
Severe Logic Errors: Logic errors like Figure 9 in a smart
contract can cause severe vulnerabilities that immediately
threaten the security of the underlying digital assets repre-
sented by the contract. This poses a challenge to standard
analysis tools that focus on specific types of low-level run-
time errors. SOLAR can successfully detect these logic errors,
while previous tools like Mythril [24] may miss them. This
is because in these logic error cases, the implementation sim-
ply does not match the intended behavior and no low-level
runtime error is triggered.
Neglected Owner Backdoors and Corner Cases: SOLAR
finds a large amount of owner backdoor errors. This shows
that software errors in the owner privileged functions are often
neglected by the community. This is undesirable because, in
ERC-20 and ERC-721 contracts, the owner corresponds the
issuer of the digital assets. Therefore, the analogies of these
owner backdoors are intentional or unintentional hidden text
in a legal contract for financial assets.
SOLAR also finds a large amount of theoretically attackable
contracts. This shows that the smart contract developer has a
tendency to ignore corner cases. For example, one vulnerable
contract casts a balance value of 256-bit integers directly
down to 128-bit integers without proper checks, assuming
the balance will always be less than 128 bits. Consider the
fact that smart contract code is often copied and reused by
multiple contracts, such code may eventually be exploited
when relevant conditions are satisfied.
Error-prone Customized Features: We also found that the
implementations of customized features in smart contracts
are often vulnerable or inconsistent with the corresponding
standards. We believe the smart contract developers should
proceed with extreme caution when designing and implement-
ing customized features.
Developer Irresponsiveness: Last but not least, we found
that smart contract developers/owners are not very respon-
sive for error reports. One explanation is that developers and
owners do not have the capability to quickly fix a reported
issue. Ethereum does not allow any update to a deployed
smart contract. The rationale is that the smart contract corre-
sponds to the law that all participants should follow and that
no one should be able to change the law. The only way to
fix a vulnerable contract is to deploy a new contract and to
persuade every participant to accept the new contract instead
of the old one. Another explanation is that as the issuers of
publicly traded digital assets, developers and owners may be
economically incentivized to hide a smart contract error if the
exploitation chance is low.
6 Related Work
Smart Contract Security: Researchers recently have pro-
posed several automated program analysis techniques to help
detect security errors and vulnerabilities in the smart contracts.
Oyente [22] implements a symbolic execution tool that detects
vulnerability patterns of transaction-ordering dependency at-
tacks, timestamp attacks, reentrance attacks, and mishandled
exception attacks. Mythril [24] and Manticore [28] are open
source symbolic execution frameworks for detecting integer
overflows and reentrance errors. Kolluri et al. use symbolic
execution techniques to detect races of smart contract transac-
tions [19]. Maian [27] analyzes traces with symbolic execu-
tion to detect vulnerable contracts that handles ether transfers.
A more recent work, Zeus [18], converts solidity source code
into a customized low level virtual machine language that is
compatible with LLVM [21] and then uses existing taint anal-
ysis and symbolic execution tools in LLVM to detect common
vulnerability patterns and fairness issues. SOLAR differs from
these symbolic execution tools in that instead of focusing
on specific patterns of runtime errors, SOLAR validates the
consistency between a contract implementation and the corre-
sponding standard. SOLAR also works with optimizations on
handling EVM storage access instructions for more efficient
symbolic execution of EVM byte code directly. Together,
these differences enable SOLAR to find significant more er-
rors (including logic errors) with much less false positives in
our experiments.
ContractFuzzer [17] proposes a fuzzing framework for de-
tecting seven kinds of vulnerabilities from Ethereum smart
contracts. Comparing to SOLAR, fuzzing techniques may
miss many errors (i.e., introduce false negatives) because
they only exercise a limited number of execution paths. Secu-
rify [30] provides a domain-specific static analysis framework
for smart contracts, that translates EVM bytecode into Data-
log and use off-the-shelf verifier to check predefined security
properties like that no storage write should occur after func-
tion calls and that all ether transfers should be protected by
conditions. TEEther [20] uses static analysis to detect control
flow paths that lead to attackable instructions that attackers
can exploit to steal ether. Comparing to SOLAR, these static
analysis techniques target specific patterns of errors, while
SOLAR can detect any deviation between an implementation
and the corresponding standard.
KEVM [16] formally defines the EVM semantics in K and
EVM* [8] translates EVM bytecode to F*. Building EVM
semantics allows a user of K or F* to build their own pol-
icy for further verification. VeriSolid [23] is a model-based
approach that allows a user to specify a transition model as
well as security rules. Similarly, Vandal [11], a static analysis
framework, translates EVM bytecode to logic relations and
detects vulnerabilities described in Soufflé language. Unfortu-
nately, these verification tools either cannot handle full EVM
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byte code or require significant human interventions during
the verification process.
Contract Development Tools: Libraries such as
openzeppelin-solidity [6] provide safe arithmetic oper-
ations which avoid integer overflow and underflow attacks.
It also provides a reference implementation of standard
protocols. However, using such libraries is not mandatory.
Ironically, BecToken included SafeInt library in its contract
code, but it does not use the library for all arithmetic
operations. Moreover, such libraries can not prevent contracts
from logic errors such as missing authorization.
Breindenbach et al. propose the hydra framework, auto-
mates the process of discovering bugs and distributing boun-
ties [10], which incentivizes the bug disclosure. Erays [33]
is a reverse engineering tool that decompiles EVM bytecode
into high-level solidity-like pseudocode. A user can further
analyzes the security issues inside the contract without ac-
cessing to the contract source code. Wang et al. propose a
test oracle for ether-related transactions that examines the
invariant between balances from a bookkeeping variable and
the ether values among accounts [31].
Symbolic Execution: Symbolic execution techniques [12,13,
15, 29] have been used to improve software security for many
years. KLEE [12, 13] is a popular symbolic execution en-
gine on LLVM framework for traditional computer programs.
DIODE [29] proposes goal-directed conditional branch en-
forcement technique to quickly explore execution paths to
detect integer overflow errors.
7 Conclusion
We presented SOLAR, a novel analysis tool for detecting stan-
dard violation errors for Ethereum smart contracts. SOLAR
opeartes with an optimized symbolic execution engine and
utilizes the standardization effort of the community. As a re-
sult, SOLAR is significantly more effective than previous tools
in our experiments, finding more errors with much less false
positives. Furthermore, our results show that standard viola-
tion errors are prevalent even in those critical smart contracts
that manipulate digital assets. This calls for more commu-
nity efforts to enforce the consistency between smart contract
implementations and contract standards.
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Variable Value
ADDRS.length 3
ADDRS[0] 0x67518339e369ab3d591d3569ab0a0d83b2ff5198
ADDRS[1] 0xd30a286ec6737b8b2a6a7b5fbb5d75b895f62956
ADDRS[2] 0x1bfa530d5d685155e98cd7d9dd23f7b6a801cfef
sender ADDRS[0]
balanceOf(sender) 0x2cda3fa1fffffffe000000020008007e87fe00001c180f800046f383eb594355
_receivers.length 3
_receivers[0] ADDRS[2]
_receivers[1] ADDRS[2]
_receivers[2] ADDRS[0]
_value 0xb380b590a3ff87ff3ffff9560000c3baaaad1d4a74e77a85be86c5459cf3a343
Figure 14: Concrete example exploits the batchTransfer()
function.
A Error Triggering Input
Figure 14 shows a concrete error triggering transaction SO-
LAR generates for exploiting the error we described in Sec-
tion 2.
B Memory Operations
Figure 15 shows an example of storing and loading mem-
ory data without any optimization. To store a 256-bit integer
value, a naive approach would first generate 32 extract in-
structions and 32 store instructions. Each pair of extract
and store instructions extract a 8-bit integer from value and
store the integer to the memory. Similarly, to load a 256-bit
integer from memory, the system would generate 32 select
instructions to load a 256-bit integer from the memory. Each
instruction loads a 8-bit integer from memory. It then would
concatenate 32 8-bit integers into a 256-bit integer.
C Invariants and Constraints
In this section, we describe how a user checks the invariants
and the constraints using SOLAR.
Total Supply: As described in Section 2 and Figure 3, ERC-
20 tokens are designed as assets that can be sent and received
and in practice many ERC-20 tokens are traded publicly and
have market value. If the total supply changes unexpectedly
due to software errors, it may have significant impact on the
market value of each token. We applied SOLAR to check if
any public function in our benchmark contracts will break the
total supply invariant.
Transfer: The transfer() function defines the most funda-
mental functionality of an ERC-20 token, that allows a user to
transfer his balances to other users. To secure a token transfer,
the contract must guarantee that the sender has enough token
to transfer. Otherwise, the token transfer should fail.
Figure 16 shows the function to build transfer policy,
where acc[0] and acc[1] are two symbolic accounts and
value is a symbolic value. Before calling the function
transfer(), account acc[0] owns pre_bal[0] tokens and
1 (declare-fun MEMORY () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec
8)))↪→
2
3 ; MSTORE(offset,value)
4 (declare-fun v_1 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_1 ((_
extract 7 0) value)))↪→
5 (declare-fun s_1 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec
8)))(assert (= s_1 (store Memory offset v_1)))↪→
6 (declare-fun v_2 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_2 ((_
extract 15 8) value)))↪→
7 (declare-fun s_2 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec
8)))(assert (= s_2 (store s_1 offset+8 v_2)))↪→
8 ...
9 (declare-fun v_32 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= v_32 ((_
extract 248 255) value)))↪→
10 (declare-fun s_32 () (Array (_ BitVec 256) (_ BitVec
8)))(assert (= s_32 (store s_31 offset+248
v_32)))
↪→
↪→
11
12 ...
13
14 ; MLOAD(offset)
15 (declare-fun a_1 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_1
(select s_32 offset)))↪→
16 (declare-fun a_2 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_2
(select s_32 offset+8)))↪→
17 ...
18 (declare-fun a_32 () (_ BitVec 8))(assert (= a_5
(select s_32 offset+248)))↪→
19 (declare-fun return () (_ BitVec 256))(assert (=
return (concat a_1 a_2 ... a_32)))↪→
Figure 15: Constraints from MSTORE and MLOAD instruc-
tions without simplification.
acc[1] owns pre_bal[1] tokens. acc[0] creates a trans-
action that transfers value tokens to acc[1]. post_bal[0]
and post_bal[1] are tokens owned by acc[0] and acc[1]
after calling the transfer() function. At line 11-18, the gen-
erated constraints check if the transfer function breaks the
security rule defined above.
Token Approval (ERC-20): The approve() and the
transferFrom() functions allow a user to authorize a third
party to spend his token. A user calls the approve() function
to allow a third party to spend tokens in his account and the
third party uses the transferFrom() function to transfer the
token.
Figure 17 shows the security policies built for approve()
and transferFrom() scheme. At line 8 account acc[0] calls
the function approve() to authorize acc[2] to spend up
to values[0] tokens. acc[2] then calls the transferFrom
function to transfer acc[0]’s token to acc[1]’s account.
A secure transferFrom() transaction should check the
following conditions. 1) acc[0] has enough tokens to per-
form the transaction; 2) the transferred token is smaller than
acc[0]’s allowance; 3) the allowance and the account bal-
ances should be updated correspondingly if the transfer suc-
ceeds (line 15-26).
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1 # Get balances before transfer is called.
2 acc = [SymAddr(), SymAddr()]
3 assume(acc[0] != acc[1])
4 value = SymInt()
5 pre_bal = [c.balanceOf(account) for account in acc]
6 assume(pre_bal[0] + pre_bal[1] >= pre_bal[0])
7 # account1 transfers value tokens to account2.
8 result = c.transfer(acc[1], value, sender=acc[0])
9 # Check if security policies is violated.
10 post_bal = [c.balanceOf(account) for account in acc]
11 check(result == 0 and
12 pre_bal[0] == post_bal[0] and
13 pre_bal[1] == post_bal[1] or
14 result != 0 and
15 pre_bal[0] - value == post_bal[0] and
16 pre_bal[1] + value == post_bal[1] and
17 post_bal[0] >= pre_bal[0] and
18 pre_bal[1] >= post_bal[1])
Figure 16: Policies for transfer function.
Token Approval (ERC-721): Similar to ERC-20, ERC-721
allows a user to transfer his ownership of a token to other
users. Different from ERC-20, ERC-721 uses the approve()
function to authorize a third party to transfer a single token
and setApprovalForAll to authorize a third party to manage
all assets.
In Figure 18, SOLAR assumes that acc[0] is not authorized
to transfer token tid and acc[1] is not the owner of tid
(line 5-12). acc[0] then creates a transaction that transfers
the ownership of tid from owner to acc[1] (line 13). A
vulnerable contract would allow the transaction and modify
the ownership correspondingly.
1 acc = [SymAddr(), SymAddr(), SymAddr()]
2 values = [SymInt(), SymInt()]
3 assume(acc[0] != acc[1] and acc[1] != acc[2])
4 # Get account balances before tokens are
transferred.↪→
5 pre_bal = [c.balanceOf(account) for account in
acc[:2]]↪→
6 assume(pre_bal[0] + pre_bal[1] >= pre_bal[0])
7 # acc[0] authorize acc[2] to spend values[0]
tokens.↪→
8 r1 = c.approve(acc[2], values[0], sender=acc[0])
9 assume(r1 != 0)
10 # acc[2] transfer values[1] tokens from
acc[0]'s account to acc[1]'s account.↪→
11 r2 = c.transferFrom(acc[0], acc[1], values[1],
sender=acc[2])↪→
12 r3 = c.allowance(acc[0], acc[2])
13 post_bal = [c.balanceOf(account) for account in
acc[:2]]↪→
14 # Check if the security policies are violated.
15 check(r2 != 0 and
16 pre_bal[0] - values[1] == post_bal[0] and
17 pre_bal[1] + values[1] == post_bal[1] and
18 r3 + values[1] == values[0] and
19 post_bal[0] <= pre_bal[0] and
20 post_bal[1] >= pre_bal[1] and
21 values[0] >= values[1] and
22 values[0] <= r3 or
23 r2 == 0 and
24 pre_bal[0] == post_bal[0] and
25 pre_bal[1] == post_bal[1] and
26 r3 == values[0])
Figure 17: Policies for approve and transferFrom functions
(ERC-20).
1 acc = [SymAddr(), SymAddr()]
2 tid = SymInt() # token id
3 assume(acc[0] != acc[1])
4 # get the owner address of the token.
5 owner = c.ownerOf(tid)
6 assume(owner != acc[1])
7 # assume the operator(acc[0]) is not
authorized to↪→
8 # manage the token.
9 app = c.getApproved(tid)
10 is_approved = c.isApprovedForAll(owner, acc[0])
11 assume(a[0] != app)
12 assume(is_approved == 0)
13 c.transferFrom(owner, a[1], tid, sender=acc[0])
14
15 # check if transfer is successful.
16 pos_owner = c.ownerOf(tid)
17 check(pos_owner == acc[1])
Figure 18: Policies for approve and transferFrom functions
(ERC-721).
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